Sukrit Mittal
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Figure: If you have $100, would you invest in this lottery?
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Figure: If you have $100, which one would you invest in?
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Figure: If you have $100, which one would you invest in?
Up to now, we used mean–variance preferences. Convenient but restrictive.
Utility theory answers a deeper question:
What does it mean to choose rationally under uncertainty?
Recall:
\[ U(\mu, \sigma^2) = \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2 \]
This framework:
Example where mean-variance fails:
Consider two investments, both with \(\mu = 10\%\) and \(\sigma = 15\%\):
Mean-variance treats them identically.
Most investors would not.
Utility theory is the rigorous foundation beneath portfolio theory.
Utility is not:
Utility is a numerical representation of preferences.
Key insight: Under certainty, utility is ordinal. Under expected utility over lotteries, it is cardinal up to a positive affine transformation.
If \(u(W_1) > u(W_2)\), we only know: \(W_1\) is preferred to \(W_2\).
The magnitude of the difference has no intrinsic meaning.
We used indifference curves to represent preferences graphically:
\[ \mu = \bar{U} + \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2 \]
This was a special case of utility theory. Now we generalize.
Consider uncertain outcomes (lotteries).
An investor can rank them:
Utility assigns numbers consistent with these rankings.
Consider three wealth outcomes:
Consider three wealth outcomes:
An investor ranks them: Lottery 2 \(\succ\) Certain $100 \(\succ\) Lottery 1
Expected values:
Note: Despite equal expected value, Certain $100 \(\succ\) Lottery 1 reveals risk aversion.
Rationality does not mean intelligence. It means:
Example of irrational behavior:
Suppose an investor states:
This violates transitivity (one of our axioms below).
Why is this problematic?
To represent preferences by expected utility, we assume four axioms.
These axioms were formalized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
This axiomatization became foundational in modern economics and finance.
Statement: For any two lotteries \(A\) and \(B\), either: \(A \succ B\), or \(B \succ A\), or \(A \sim B\)
Interpretation: The investor can always compare and rank alternatives.
This rules out “incomparable” lottery pairs.
Critique: Strong assumption. In practice, people often face hard-to-compare choices.
Statement: If \(A \succ B\) and \(B \succ C\), then \(A \succ C\).
Interpretation: Preferences are consistent. No cycles.
Without this, you’re vulnerable to money pumps (as shown earlier).
Critique: Reasonable. Violations indicate incoherent preferences.
Statement: If \(A \succ B \succ C\), there exists some probability \(p \in (0,1)\) such that:
\[ B \sim pA + (1-p)C \]
Interpretation: No outcome is infinitely better or worse than another.
No outcome is treated as lexicographically infinite in value.
Example: \(A\) = win $1 million; \(B\) = get $100,000; \(C\) = win $0
Continuity says: there’s some \(p\) where you’re indifferent between:
In this example, \(p \approx 0.10\) makes the two options approximately comparable.
Critique: Philosophically controversial. But mathematically necessary for utility representation.
Statement: If \(A \succ B\), then for any lottery \(C\) and \(p \in (0,1)\):
\[ pA + (1-p)C \succ pB + (1-p)C \]
Interpretation: Mixing both lotteries with a third option \(C\) preserves the ranking.
Example:
If you prefer \(A\) to \(B\), then independence says you also prefer:
Critique: This is the most controversial axiom. Violated by many experimental subjects (Allais paradox). But necessary for expected utility representation.
If preferences satisfy the four axioms, then:
There exists a utility function \(u(\cdot)\) such that preferences are represented by expected utility.
That is, for any lottery with outcomes \(W_1, \ldots, W_n\) and probabilities \(p_1, \ldots, p_n\):
\[ U = \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i u(W_i) \]
Interpretation:
This theorem tells us:
Rational preferences (satisfying axioms) \(\iff\) Expected utility maximization
We can model investor behavior using \(\max \mathbb{E}[u(W)]\)
All portfolio choice problems reduce to finding optimal \(W\) distributions
Limitation: The theorem only guarantees existence.
It does not tell us what \(u\) looks like.
That requires additional assumptions or estimation.
Given wealth \(W\) as a random variable, the investor chooses portfolios to maximize expected utility, subject to budget constraints:
\[ \max \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \]
This is the most general formulation of choice under uncertainty.
Recall that we found the optimal portfolio by solving mean-variance optimization: \[ \max_w \quad w^\top \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2} w^\top \Sigma w \]
Now we generalize: for any utility function \(u\): \[ \max_w \quad \mathbb{E}[u(w^\top \mu)] \]
Key difference:
Suppose, two assets: risk-free at \(R_f = 5\%\) and risky with \(\mu = 12\%\), \(\sigma = 20\%\); utility: \(u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}\) with \(\gamma = 0.01\); initial wealth: \(W_0 = 100\)
Terminal wealth: \(W = W_0[1 + w R_S + (1-w)R_f]\), where \(w\) is the weight on the risky asset and \(R_S\) is its return.
Objective: \[ \max_w \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\gamma W_0[1 + w R_S + (1-w)R_f]}] \]
For normally distributed returns, using moment generating function of normal distribution, this simplifies to: \[ w^* = \frac{\mu - R_f}{\gamma \sigma^2 W_0} \]
Plugging in numbers: \[ w^* = \frac{0.12 - 0.05}{0.01 \times 0.04 \times 100} = \frac{0.07}{0.04} = 1.75 \]
Interpretation: Invest 175% in risky asset (leverage by borrowing 75% at \(R_f\)).
If \(u\) represents preferences, so does: \[ \tilde u = a u + b \quad (a>0) \]
Proof sketch: If lottery \(A\) is preferred to \(B\) under \(u\): \[ \mathbb{E}[u(A)] > \mathbb{E}[u(B)] \]
Then under \(\tilde{u} = au + b\) with \(a > 0\): \[ \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}(A)] = a\mathbb{E}[u(A)] + b > a\mathbb{E}[u(B)] + b = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}(B)] \]
The ranking is preserved.
Consequence: Preference rankings are preserved under positive affine transformations.
Example:
If \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) represents your preferences, so does: (a) \(\tilde{u}(W) = 10 \ln(W) + 5\); (b) \(\hat{u}(W) = 0.5 \ln(W) - 3\).
Only the shape of the utility curve matters, not its scale or location.
Three utility functions dominate finance theory and practice. Each with strengths and weaknesses; and none is universally correct.

Figure: The three main utility functions used in finance. Quadratic has a satiation point (problematic), exponential is always increasing but wealth-independent, and power/log utilities are empirically most realistic.
| Utility Function | Quadratic | Exponential (CARA) | Power (CRRA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key Features | Analytically tractable Justifies mean-variance Connection to CAPM |
Tractable under normal distributions Constant risk aversion Popular in derivatives pricing |
Empirically more realistic Used in asset pricing models Standard in macroeconomics |
| Typical Uses | Mean-variance analysis, CAPM | Derivatives pricing, theoretical models | Asset pricing, macroeconomics |
Let’s examine each in detail.
\[ u(W) = W - \frac{\gamma}{2}W^2, \quad \gamma > 0 \] Properties:
Mean–Variance Connection: For a random wealth \(W\) with \(\mathbb{E}[W] = \mu\) and \(\text{Var}(W) = \sigma^2\): \[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = \mathbb{E}\left[W - \frac{\gamma}{2}W^2\right] = \mathbb{E}[W] - \frac{\gamma}{2}\mathbb{E}[W^2] \] Expand \(W^2\) about the mean: \[ W^2 = (W - \mu + \mu)^2 = (W-\mu)^2 + 2\mu(W-\mu) + \mu^2 \] Taking expectations: \[ \mathbb{E}[W^2] = \mathbb{E}[(W-\mu)^2] + 2\mu\mathbb{E}[W-\mu] + \mu^2 = \sigma^2 + \mu^2 \] since \(\mathbb{E}[W-\mu] = 0\) (by definition of expected value).
Substitute back into expected utility: \[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}(\sigma^2 + \mu^2) = \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\mu^2 \] For small values of \(\mu^2\): \[ \max_w \left[\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\mu^2\right] \quad \iff \quad \max_w \left[\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2\right] \]
Problem 1: Satiation
Since \(u'(W) = 1 - \gamma W\), marginal utility becomes negative for \(W > 1/\gamma\).
Interpretation: Beyond a certain wealth level, more money makes you worse off!
This is not economically plausible.
Example: If \(\gamma = 0.01\), then \(u'(W) < 0\) for \(W > 100\).
No one refuses wealth above $100.
Problem 2: Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA)
As wealth increases, the investor becomes more risk-averse (in absolute terms).
Empirically false: wealthy people take on more risk in absolute dollars.
Problem 3: Asymmetry
Quadratic treats gains and losses asymmetrically in problematic ways.
Despite these flaws, quadratic utility is used because: * It delivers mean-variance * Mean-variance is tractable * CAPM requires it
This reflects a tractability-realism tradeoff.
Suppose \(\gamma = 0.01\) and consider two wealth levels:
Utility gain from doubling wealth: \(50 - 37.5 = 12.5\)
Now consider:
Utility “gain”: \(37.5 - 50 = -12.5\) (utility decreases!)
This illustrates the satiation problem.
\[ u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}, \quad \gamma > 0 \]
Or equivalently (affine transformation):
\[ u(W) = -\frac{1}{\gamma}e^{-\gamma W} \]
Properties:
Name: CARA = Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
We’ll see why shortly.
Advantage 1: Tractability under normality
For \(W \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)\), the moment generating function is: \[ \mathbb{E}[e^{tW}] = e^{t\mu + \frac{1}{2}t^2\sigma^2} \] Setting \(t = -\gamma\): \[ \mathbb{E}[e^{-\gamma W}] = e^{-\gamma\mu + \frac{1}{2}\gamma^2\sigma^2} \] Therefore: \[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = -e^{-\gamma \mu + \frac{1}{2}\gamma^2\sigma^2} \] Taking logarithm (monotonic transformation preserves preferences): \[ \max \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \iff \max \left[\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2\right] \] Mean-variance optimization again! But now without the satiation problem.
Advantage 2: Wealth-independent risk attitudes
With CARA, risk tolerance doesn’t change with wealth level.
This simplifies many models.
Main Issue: Constant absolute risk aversion is empirically false.
Example:
Consider a 50-50 gamble: win $1000 or lose $1000.
But CARA predicts both should make the same choice.
Why? Because risk aversion depends only on \(\gamma\), not on \(W\).
This pattern is inconsistent with most empirical evidence.
Wealthy people take bigger risks (in dollar terms) than poor people.
Despite this flaw: Exponential utility is widely used in: * Option pricing models * Portfolio optimization under normality * Theoretical analysis (tractability)
Let \(\gamma = 0.0001\) and consider:
Marginal utility at \(W = 50,000\):
\[ u'(50,000) = 0.0001 e^{-5} \approx 0.0000674 \]
Marginal utility at \(W = 100,000\):
\[ u'(100,000) = 0.0001 e^{-10} \approx 0.00000454 \]
Marginal utility decreases (as wealth increases), but the ratio of marginal utilities to wealth remains constant.
\[ u(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}, \quad \gamma > 0, \gamma \neq 1 \]
Special case (\(\gamma = 1\)):
\[ u(W) = \ln(W) \]
Properties:
Name: CRRA = Constant Relative Risk Aversion
Advantage 1: Scale invariance
Consider scaling all payoffs by a constant \(\lambda > 0\). With power utility, preferences are unchanged.
Proof: Compare two lotteries \(A\) and \(B\).
\[ \mathbb{E}[u(\lambda W_A)] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(\lambda W_A)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\right] = \lambda^{1-\gamma}\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{W_A^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\right] \]
Similarly for \(B\). The factor \(\lambda^{1-\gamma}\) cancels when comparing.
Interpretation: If all prices and wealth double, behavior is unchanged.
This matches real-world observations: rich people don’t become infinitely risk-averse.
Advantage 2: Empirically realistic
Studies suggest \(\gamma \in [1, 10]\) for most investors. Log utility (\(\gamma = 1\)) is a common benchmark.
Advantage 3: Used in asset pricing
Power utility appears in: * Consumption CAPM (CCAPM) * Long-run risk models * Habit formation models
It’s the workhorse of modern macrofinance.
\[ u(W) = \frac{W^{-1}}{-1} = -\frac{1}{W} \] Evaluate at different wealth levels:
Utility gain from doubling wealth (50 to 100): \[ \Delta u = -0.01 - (-0.02) = 0.01 \] Utility gain from doubling again (100 to 200): \[ \Delta u = -0.005 - (-0.01) = 0.005 \]
Observation: The utility gain from doubling wealth decreases.
For CRRA utility, the key property is: \[ R(W) = -W\frac{u''(W)}{u'(W)} = \gamma \] so relative risk aversion is constant.
\[ u(W) = \ln(W) \]
Special properties:
“Kelly Criterion” connection:
Maximizing \(\mathbb{E}[\ln(W)]\) is equivalent to maximizing long-run geometric growth rate.
This is the foundation of the Kelly betting strategy.
Example: With log utility and \(\gamma = 1\):
Utility gain from doubling: Always \(\ln(2) \approx 0.693\), regardless of starting point.
| Feature | Quadratic | Exponential (CARA) | Power (CRRA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Form | \(W - \frac{\gamma}{2}W^2\) | \(-e^{-\gamma W}\) | \(\frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\) |
| Domain | \(W < 1/\gamma\) | \(W \in \mathbb{R}\) | \(W > 0\) |
| Satiation | Yes (major flaw) | No | No |
| Mean-variance | Exact | Under normality | No |
| Risk aversion | Increasing (IARA) | Constant (CARA) | Constant (CRRA) |
| Scale invariance | No | No | Yes |
| Empirical realism | Poor | Poor | Good |
| Tractability | High | High | Medium |
| Usage | Portfolio theory | Derivatives pricing | Asset pricing, macro |
Practical advice:
Most modern research uses power utility.
Risk aversion captures dislike for uncertainty.
Formally:
An investor is risk-averse if she prefers the expected value of a lottery to the lottery itself.
Mathematically:
\[ u(\mathbb{E}[W]) \geq \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \]
for all random wealth \(W\).
Interpretation: Certainty is valued over risk.
Risk-averse: \(u(\mathbb{E}[W]) > \mathbb{E}[u(W)]\) * Prefers certainty * Most investors
Risk-neutral: \(u(\mathbb{E}[W]) = \mathbb{E}[u(W)]\) * Indifferent between certainty and fair gambles * Rare in practice * Utility is linear: \(u(W) = aW + b\)
Risk-loving: \(u(\mathbb{E}[W]) < \mathbb{E}[u(W)]\) * Prefers risk over certainty * Gamblers, some entrepreneurs * Utility is convex: \(u''(W) > 0\)
From here on, we focus on risk-averse investors.
Consider two options:
Expected value of both: $50
Risk-averse investor: Chooses Option A (certainty)
Risk-neutral investor: Indifferent
Risk-loving investor: Chooses Option B (gamble)
Most people choose Option A—evidence of risk aversion.
Theorem: An investor is risk-averse if and only if \(u\) is concave. \[ u''(W) \leq 0 \]
Direction 1: Concavity \(\implies\) Risk aversion
Suppose \(u\) is concave. By Jensen’s inequality: \[ u(\mathbb{E}[W]) \geq \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \]
This is exactly the definition of risk aversion. âś“
Direction 2: Risk aversion \(\implies\) Concavity
Suppose \(u(\mathbb{E}[W]) \geq \mathbb{E}[u(W)]\) for all \(W\). Consider a 50-50 lottery between \(W_1\) and \(W_2\): \[ u\left(\frac{W_1 + W_2}{2}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}u(W_1) + \frac{1}{2}u(W_2) \]
This is the definition of concavity (for discrete case). Extending to continuous case gives \(u''(W) \leq 0\). âś“

Figure: Concave utility functions generate risk aversion. The utility of expected wealth u(E[W]) exceeds the expected utility E[u(W)], creating a risk premium. The investor prefers the certainty equivalent (CE) over the risky lottery.
For a concave function:
Key insight: Losing $10 hurts more than gaining $10 feels good. This asymmetry explains risk aversion.
Certainty Equivalent (CE):
The certain amount that gives the same utility as the risky lottery.
\[ u(CE) = \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \]
Risk Premium (RP):
The amount an investor will pay to avoid risk.
\[ RP = \mathbb{E}[W] - CE \]
Interpretation:
Suppose \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) and consider:
Expected value: \[ \mathbb{E}[W] = 0.5(100) + 0.5(25) = 62.5 \]
Expected utility: \[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = 0.5\ln(100) + 0.5\ln(25) = 0.5(4.605) + 0.5(3.219) = 3.912 \]
Certainty equivalent: Solve \(\ln(CE) = 3.912\) \[ CE = e^{3.912} = 50 \]
Risk premium: \[ RP = 62.5 - 50 = 12.5 \]
Interpretation: The investor is willing to pay $12.50 to avoid the risk and receive $50 for certain instead of the gamble with expected value $62.50.

Figure: (Left) Log utility and its derivative showing diminishing marginal utility. (Right) Comparison of marginal utilities across different utility functions. All concave utilities exhibit decreasing marginal utility, but at different rates.
Key observation: The first dollar is more valuable than the millionth dollar.
This is the foundation of risk aversion.
Two measures quantify how risk-averse an investor is.
Developed independently by Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt (1960s).
\[ A(W) = -\frac{u''(W)}{u'(W)} \]
Interpretation:
Why this formula?
Consider a small risk \(\tilde{\varepsilon}\) with \(\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon}] = 0\) and variance \(\sigma^2\).
Second-order Taylor expansion around current wealth \(W\): \[ u(W+\tilde{\varepsilon}) \approx u(W)+u'(W)\tilde{\varepsilon}+\frac{1}{2}u''(W)\tilde{\varepsilon}^2 \]
Taking expectations and using \(\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon}]=0\), \(\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon}^2]=\sigma^2\): \[ \mathbb{E}[u(W+\tilde{\varepsilon})] \approx u(W)+u'(W)\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon}] + \frac{1}{2}u''(W)\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon}^2] = u(W)+\frac{1}{2}u''(W)\sigma^2 \]
Define certainty equivalent \(CE\) by: \[ u(CE)=\mathbb{E}[u(W+\tilde{\varepsilon})], \qquad CE = W - RP \]
For small \(RP\), first-order expansion of the left side: \[ u(W-RP)\approx u(W)-u'(W)RP \]
Equate both sides: \[ RP \approx -\frac{u''(W)}{2u'(W)}\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{2}A(W)\sigma^2 \]
So \(A(W)\) directly determines willingness to bear small risks.
\[ R(W) = -W\frac{u''(W)}{u'(W)} = W \cdot A(W) \]
Interpretation:
Why multiply by \(W\)?
\(R(W)\) measures aversion to proportional risks.
If wealth doubles, how do risk attitudes change?
CRRA is more realistic.

Figure: (Left) Absolute risk aversion A(W) for different utility functions. CARA has constant A(W), while CRRA has decreasing A(W). (Right) Relative risk aversion R(W). CRRA utilities have constant R(W), matching empirical evidence that investors maintain constant portfolio fractions.
1. Quadratic: \(u(W) = W - \frac{\gamma}{2}W^2\) \[ A(W) = -\frac{-\gamma}{1 - \gamma W} = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma W}; \quad R(W) = W \cdot \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma W} = \frac{\gamma W}{1 - \gamma W} \]
Observation: Both \(A(W)\) and \(R(W)\) increase with \(W\) (IARA and IRRA).
This is unrealistic: suggests rich people are more risk-averse. âś—
2. Exponential (CARA): \(u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}\) \[ A(W) = -\frac{-\gamma^2 e^{-\gamma W}}{\gamma e^{-\gamma W}} = \gamma; \quad R(W) = W \cdot \gamma \]
Observation: * \(A(W) = \gamma\) is constant (CARA—as the name suggests) ✓ * \(R(W) = \gamma W\) increases linearly with wealth (IRRA) ✗
CARA is tractable but not empirically realistic.
3. Power (CRRA): \(u(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\) \[ A(W) = -\frac{-\gamma W^{-\gamma-1}}{W^{-\gamma}} = \frac{\gamma}{W}; \quad R(W) = W \cdot \frac{\gamma}{W} = \gamma \]
Observation: * \(A(W) = \gamma/W\) decreases with wealth (DARA—realistic!) ✓ * \(R(W) = \gamma\) is constant (CRRA—as the name suggests) ✓
Power utility has the best empirical properties.
For \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) (which is CRRA with \(\gamma = 1\)):
\[ u'(W) = \frac{1}{W}, \quad u''(W) = -\frac{1}{W^2} \]
\[ A(W) = \frac{1}{W}, \quad R(W) = 1 \]
Interpretation: Relative risk aversion of 1.
This is often considered a “moderate” level of risk aversion.
Consider three investors at \(W = 100\):
| Utility | \(A(100)\) | \(R(100)\) | Risk attitude |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quadratic (\(\gamma = 0.01\)) | 0.01 | 1 | Moderate |
| Exponential (\(\gamma = 0.01\)) | 0.01 | 1 | Moderate |
| Power (\(\gamma = 2\)) | 0.02 | 2 | More risk-averse |
| Log | 0.01 | 1 | Moderate |
Now at \(W = 200\):
| Utility | \(A(200)\) | \(R(200)\) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quadratic (\(\gamma = 0.01\)) | 0.0125 | 2.5 | Both increase (IARA, IRRA) |
| Exponential (\(\gamma = 0.01\)) | 0.01 | 2 | \(A\) constant, \(R\) doubles (CARA) |
| Power (\(\gamma = 2\)) | 0.01 | 2 | \(A\) halves, \(R\) constant (CRRA) |
| Log | 0.005 | 1 | \(A\) halves, \(R\) constant (CRRA) |
Key insight: Only CRRA (power/log) maintains constant relative risk aversion as wealth changes. This matches empirical evidence that rich people invest a constant fraction of wealth in risky assets.
Empirical studies and calibration exercises suggest:
| \(\gamma\) | Risk Attitude | Typical Investor |
|---|---|---|
| \(< 1\) | Low risk aversion | Aggressive, young investors |
| \(1\) (log utility) | Moderate | Benchmark |
| \(2-4\) | Moderate-high | Typical household |
| \(5-10\) | High | Conservative investors |
| \(> 10\) | Very high | Near retirement, very cautious |
Equity premium puzzle: Some asset pricing models require \(\gamma > 10\) to match historical stock returns. (read me)
Power-law Portfolios: (read me)

Figure: Risk premiums for the same lottery under different CRRA utility functions. Higher Îł (more risk aversion) leads to larger risk premiums. The investor with Îł=3 demands much more compensation to accept risk than the investor with Îł=0.5.
Mean-variance optimization and CAPM assumed investors care only about \(\mu\) and \(\sigma^2\).
When is this justified?
Two sufficient conditions:
Under either condition, expected utility reduces to mean-variance form.
We showed earlier that with \(u(W) = W - \frac{\gamma}{2}W^2\):
\[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = \mathbb{E}[W] - \frac{\gamma}{2}\mathbb{E}[W^2] \]
\[ = \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}(\sigma^2 + \mu^2) \]
For optimization over portfolios with similar \(\mu\), the \(\mu^2\) term is approximately constant.
Result:
\[ \max \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \quad \iff \quad \max \left[\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2\right] \]
Limitation: Quadratic utility has serious flaws (satiation, IARA).
So we need an alternative justification…
Theorem: If returns are normally distributed, then any risk-averse investor behaves as if maximizing mean-variance utility.
Proof sketch:
Let \(W = W_0(1 + R_p)\) where \(R_p \sim N(\mu_p, \sigma_p^2)\).
Then \(W \sim N(W_0(1+\mu_p), W_0^2\sigma_p^2)\).
For any utility function \(u\):
\[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} u(W_0(1+r)) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_p^2}} e^{-\frac{(r-\mu_p)^2}{2\sigma_p^2}} dr \]
Under normality, the distribution of \(W\) is fully characterized by \(\mu_p\) and \(\sigma_p^2\).
So portfolio comparisons can be summarized in \((\mu_p, \sigma_p^2)\) space (for a fixed utility specification).
Preferences can be summarized by indifference curves in \((\sigma, \mu)\) space.
Key insight: This justification doesn’t require quadratic utility!
Works with exponential, power, or any concave \(u\).
Reality check: Empirically, returns are not perfectly normal.
Deviations from normality:
Despite violations: Normal approximation is often “good enough” for: * Portfolio optimization * Risk measurement (for moderate horizons) * Asset pricing (as a baseline)
But for tail risk, derivatives pricing, and crisis periods, normality fails badly.

Figure: (Left) Two return distributions with identical mean and variance but different skewness. (Right) Expected utility comparison shows that mean-variance optimization misses important preference information. Investors with CRRA utility may prefer the skewed distribution despite identical mean-variance characteristics.
Recall CAPM: \[ \mathbb{E}[R_i] - R_f = \beta_i(\mathbb{E}[R_M] - R_f); \quad \beta_i = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_M)}{\text{Var}(R_M)} \]
CAPM assumptions:
Utility foundation:
Assumption #1 (mean-variance) is justified by:
Without any of these, mean-variance optimization is just a heuristic.
With these, it’s optimal behavior.
From CAPM, all investors hold:
The mix depends on risk aversion \(\gamma\) from mean-variance optimization: \[ w^* = \frac{\mu_M - R_f}{\gamma \sigma_M^2} \]
Equilibrium condition: Market clearing requires the market portfolio to be optimal for the “representative investor.”
This pins down the relationship between expected returns and betas.
Key result: If all investors maximize expected utility under quadratic or normal assumptions, CAPM holds in equilibrium.
CAPM breaks down when:
Extensions:
These generalizations move beyond mean-variance.
But they lose the elegance and tractability of CAPM.
1. Market portfolio need not be mean–variance efficient
2. Pricing relations become nonlinear
3. Heterogeneous preferences complicate equilibrium
4. Time and state-dependent preferences
Modern asset pricing: Uses general utility functions (often power utility) to explain:
| Lecture | Framework | Utility Assumption |
|---|---|---|
| 06 | Risk-free + risky assets, CAL | Mean-variance (implicit) |
| 07 | Multi-asset portfolios, MVP | Mean-variance (implicit) |
| 08 | CAPM, beta pricing | Quadratic or normality |
| 09 | General expected utility | Expected utility with concave \(u\) (risk-averse case) |
Progression:
Key takeaway:
Mean-variance is not arbitrary.
It is optimal under specific conditions:
When these fail, we need richer models.
But mean-variance remains the benchmark.
CAPM is elegant, but real-world return distributions are richer than mean-variance summaries.
Utility theory clarifies both the strengths and limits of the CAPM benchmark.

Figure: (Left) Portfolio allocation as a fraction of wealth. CARA investors reduce their allocation as wealth increases, while CRRA investors maintain constant fractions. (Right) Dollar investment in risky assets. CRRA utilities exhibit scale-invariance—doubling wealth doubles dollar investment, maintaining constant portfolio fractions.
Empirical evidence: CRRA better matches observed behavior.
Rich people invest more dollars in risky assets, but maintain similar portfolio fractions to poorer investors.
Part (a): Show that concavity of \(u\) implies risk aversion using Jensen’s inequality.
Part (b): Give an example of a risk-averse investor rejecting a fair gamble.
Solution:
(a) By Jensen’s inequality, for a concave function \(u\) and random variable \(W\):
\[ u(\mathbb{E}[W]) \geq \mathbb{E}[u(W)] \]
This is exactly the definition of risk aversion: the investor prefers the certain expected value to the risky lottery.
(b) Let \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) and \(W_0 = 100\).
Consider a fair gamble: 50% chance of winning $20, 50% chance of losing $20.
Expected value: \(\mathbb{E}[W] = 0.5(120) + 0.5(80) = 100\)
Expected utility of gamble:
\[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = 0.5\ln(120) + 0.5\ln(80) \approx 0.5(4.787) + 0.5(4.382) = 4.585 \]
Utility of certain amount:
\[ u(100) = \ln(100) \approx 4.605 \]
Since \(4.605 > 4.585\), the investor rejects the fair gamble.
Part (a): Compute absolute and relative risk aversion for exponential utility:
\[ u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W} \]
Part (b): Interpret why this is called “CARA” (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion).
Part (c): Show that for power utility \(u(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\), relative risk aversion is constant.
Solution:
(a) For \(u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}\):
\[ u'(W) = \gamma e^{-\gamma W}, \quad u''(W) = -\gamma^2 e^{-\gamma W} \]
Absolute risk aversion:
\[ A(W) = -\frac{u''(W)}{u'(W)} = -\frac{-\gamma^2 e^{-\gamma W}}{\gamma e^{-\gamma W}} = \gamma \]
Relative risk aversion:
\[ R(W) = W \cdot A(W) = W\gamma \]
(b) \(A(W) = \gamma\) is constant—independent of wealth level.
This means a $1000 risk is equally undesirable whether you have $10,000 or $1,000,000.
Empirically unrealistic, but mathematically convenient.
(c) For \(u(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\):
\[ u'(W) = W^{-\gamma}, \quad u''(W) = -\gamma W^{-\gamma-1} \]
\[ R(W) = -W\frac{u''(W)}{u'(W)} = -W\frac{-\gamma W^{-\gamma-1}}{W^{-\gamma}} = \gamma \]
Constant in \(W\)—hence “CRRA.”
An investor with \(u(W) = W^{0.5}\) (CRRA with \(\gamma = 0.5\)) faces a lottery:
Part (a): Compute the expected value of the lottery.
Part (b): Compute the certainty equivalent.
Part (c): Compute the risk premium.
Part (d): If the investor had \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) instead, would the risk premium be higher or lower? Explain intuitively.
Solution:
(a) Expected value:
\[ \mathbb{E}[W] = 0.6(100) + 0.4(25) = 60 + 10 = 70 \]
(b) Expected utility:
\[ \mathbb{E}[u(W)] = 0.6\sqrt{100} + 0.4\sqrt{25} = 0.6(10) + 0.4(5) = 6 + 2 = 8 \]
Certainty equivalent: Solve \(\sqrt{CE} = 8\)
\[ CE = 64 \]
(c) Risk premium:
\[ RP = \mathbb{E}[W] - CE = 70 - 64 = 6 \]
(d) For \(u(W) = \ln(W)\):
\[ \mathbb{E}[\ln(W)] = 0.6\ln(100) + 0.4\ln(25) \approx 0.6(4.605) + 0.4(3.219) = 4.051 \]
\[ CE = e^{4.051} \approx 57.4 \]
\[ RP = 70 - 57.4 = 12.6 \]
Higher risk premium because log utility (\(\gamma = 1\)) exhibits more risk aversion than square-root utility (\(\gamma = 0.5\)).
Suppose returns are normally distributed: \(R \sim N(0.12, 0.04)\) (\(\mu = 12\%\), \(\sigma^2 = 4\%\)).
Part (a): For an investor with exponential utility \(u(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}\) and \(\gamma = 0.01\), show that maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing \(\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2\).
Part (b): Compute the certainty equivalent return for this investor.
Part (c): Would an investor with quadratic utility \(u(W) = W - 0.005W^2\) rank portfolios differently? Explain.
Solution:
(a) For normal \(R\), the moment generating function gives:
\[ \mathbb{E}[e^{-\gamma W_0(1+R)}] = e^{-\gamma W_0(1+\mu) + \frac{1}{2}\gamma^2 W_0^2 \sigma^2} \]
Maximizing \(\mathbb{E}[-e^{-\gamma W}]\) is equivalent to minimizing the exponent:
\[ \min \left[-\gamma W_0(1+\mu) + \frac{1}{2}\gamma^2 W_0^2 \sigma^2\right] \]
\[ \iff \max \left[\mu - \frac{\gamma W_0}{2}\sigma^2\right] \]
For fixed \(W_0\), this is mean-variance.
(b) Certainty equivalent return \(r_{CE}\) satisfies:
\[ -e^{-\gamma W_0(1+r_{CE})} = \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\gamma W_0(1+R)}] \]
\[ r_{CE} = \mu - \frac{\gamma W_0}{2}\sigma^2 = 0.12 - \frac{0.01 \times W_0}{2} \times 0.04 \]
For \(W_0 = 100\):
\[ r_{CE} = 0.12 - 0.02 = 0.10 = 10\% \]
(c) With quadratic utility, expected utility is:
\[ \mathbb{E}[W - 0.005W^2] \approx W_0(1+\mu) - 0.005[W_0^2(1+\mu)^2 + W_0^2\sigma^2] \]
This also reduces to mean-variance form (ignoring higher-order terms).
So both investors rank portfolios identically under normality.
Consider two investments with the same mean (\(\mu = 10\%\)) and variance (\(\sigma^2 = 4\%\)):
Part (a): Verify that both have \(\mu = 10\%\) and \(\sigma^2 = 4\%\).
Part (b): For an investor with \(u(W) = \ln(W)\) and \(W_0 = 100\), compute expected utility for both investments.
Part (c): Which investment does the investor prefer? Why does mean-variance fail here?
Solution:
(a) Investment A: \[ \mu_A = 0.5(-0.10) + 0.5(0.30) = 0.10 \] \[ \sigma_A^2 = 0.5(-0.10-0.10)^2 + 0.5(0.30-0.10)^2 = 0.5(0.04) + 0.5(0.04) = 0.04 \]
Investment B: \[ \mu_B = 0.8(0.00) + 0.2(0.50) = 0.10 \] \[ \sigma_B^2 = 0.8(0.00-0.10)^2 + 0.2(0.50-0.10)^2 = 0.8(0.01) + 0.2(0.16) = 0.04 \]
So both have identical mean and variance, but different skewness.
(b) For \(W_0 = 100\):
Investment A gives wealth outcomes \(90\) and \(130\): \[ \mathbb{E}[\ln(W_A)] = 0.5\ln(90) + 0.5\ln(130) \approx 4.684 \]
Investment B gives wealth outcomes \(100\) and \(150\): \[ \mathbb{E}[\ln(W_B)] = 0.8\ln(100) + 0.2\ln(150) \approx 4.686 \]
(c) The investor prefers Investment B since \(4.686 > 4.684\).
Mean-variance fails because it uses only \((\mu,\sigma^2)\) and ignores higher moments (here, skewness), while expected utility is sensitive to full distributional shape.
An investor with \(u(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\) and \(\gamma = 2\) must allocate between:
Initial wealth: \(W_0 = 100\).
Part (a): Write the optimization problem.
Part (b): For CRRA utility with normally distributed returns, the optimal allocation is:
\[ w^* = \frac{\mu - R_f}{\gamma \sigma^2} \]
Compute \(w^*\).
Part (c): Compare this to the result for exponential utility with \(\gamma = 0.02\) (from Exercise 4). Which investor takes more risk in absolute dollars?
Solution:
(a) Optimization problem:
\[ \max_w \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{(W_0[w(1+R_S) + (1-w)(1+R_f)])^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\right] \]
Subject to: \(0 \leq w \leq 1\) (if no leverage/shorting allowed).
(b) Optimal allocation:
\[ w^* = \frac{0.15 - 0.05}{2 \times 0.09} = \frac{0.10}{0.18} \approx 0.556 = 55.6\% \]
Invest 55.6% in risky asset, 44.4% in risk-free.
(c) For exponential utility (CARA):
\[ w^* = \frac{\mu - R_f}{\gamma \sigma^2 W_0} = \frac{0.10}{0.02 \times 0.09 \times 100} = \frac{0.10}{0.18} \approx 0.556 \]
Same optimal weight! But this is a special case where parameters align.
In general: * CRRA: \(w\) independent of \(W_0\) (scale-invariant) * CARA: \(w\) decreases with \(W_0\) (richer people take less risk as a fraction)
For each utility function below, calculate \(A(100)\) and \(R(100)\):
Part (a): Rank the utilities by risk aversion at \(W = 100\).
Part (b): Which utility exhibits CRRA? Identify the \(\gamma\) parameter.
Part (c): Show that \(u_3(W) = -1/W\) is the CRRA form with \(\gamma = 2\).
Solution:
(a)
\(u_1(W) = W^{0.5}\) (CRRA with \(\gamma = 0.5\)): \[A(100) = \frac{0.5}{100} = 0.005, \quad R(100) = 0.5\]
\(u_2(W) = \ln(W)\) (CRRA with \(\gamma = 1\)): \[A(100) = \frac{1}{100} = 0.01, \quad R(100) = 1\]
\(u_3(W) = -W^{-1}\) (CRRA with \(\gamma = 2\)): \[A(100) = \frac{2}{100} = 0.02, \quad R(100) = 2\]
Ranking by risk aversion: \(u_3 > u_2 > u_1\)
(b) All three exhibit CRRA with \(\gamma = 0.5, 1, 2\) respectively.
(c) The CRRA family is \[ u(W)=\frac{W^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}. \] Setting \(\gamma=2\) gives \[ u(W)=\frac{W^{-1}}{-1}=-\frac{1}{W}=u_3(W). \] So \(u_3\) is exactly CRRA with \(\gamma=2\).
Key insight: Utility theory is not psychology—it’s a mathematical framework for consistent choice under uncertainty.
Next lecture: We explore specific risk measures beyond variance—Value-at-Risk (VaR) and coherent risk measures.
Because investors care about downside risk, not just volatility.